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The contemporary moment provides an acute illustration of the
dangers of historical amnesia—as if the Trump Administration’s
policies of exclusion, extremist nationalism, and presidential
imperialism were singular to ‘now,’ and entirely reversible in the
next election. This Article argues to the contrary; that we have been
down this road before, and the current crisis in immigration and
refugee policies is the inevitable development of trends of racism,
including anti-Arab, anti-Muslim racism and xenophobia, that have
only become normalized by the populist resurgence of Trumpism.
If this premise is correct—that we are experiencing a culmination
of a historical trajectory—what lessons from past legal-activist
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mobilization around implementing international law can be applied
to the present? Focusing on a few select efforts over time that used
international law—human rights treaties and other instruments—
and international legal interpretation to litigating refugee and
asylum claims in the United States, this Article posits that the U.S.
constitutional framework is inadequate to address the serious
undermining of immigration and refugee rights. Although prior
efforts at incorporating human rights norms have thus far been
insufficient, more robust and strategic application of international
human rights norms is urgently needed to seriously challenge the
migration crisis of our time.
As support for this premise, it is useful to examine three prior
periods of significance for the rights of refugees and immigrants:
the refugee influx from Central America during the civil wars in the
1980s, the anti-Arab, anti-Muslim refugee and immigrant measures
during the 1990s, and the post-9/11 Guantanamo litigation. What
were some of the key challenges that lawyers and advocates made
to the worst of the policies in those periods, and how useful were
international law arguments to those strategies?
I draw on these examples from the past to illustrate that we have
been down this road before. This is not the only time that racism
and xenophobia have been normalized at the very top of government
and mainstreamed by Congress and the media. Concurrently,
however, there has been a massive response by civil society.
Thousands of people spontaneously showed up at airports to protest
the ‘Muslim’ ban, and lawyers volunteered all over the country to
file habeas petitions to allow non-citizens to enter in defiance of the
ban.1 So far, the courts have mostly struck down the various
versions of the Muslim ban, though that litigation is now pending at
the Supreme Court.2 However, prior efforts to push back against
similar extreme measures against immigrants and refugees starkly
illustrate the limits of constitutional protections, and that
international legal rights are needed more urgently than ever to fill
the lacunae in domestic legal protections. In this short introductory
Article to the Symposium Issue, I offer no more than an overview
of the issues raised during previous moments of legal crisis rather
1 See Jonah Engel Bromwich, Lawyers Mobilize at Nation’s Airports After Trump’s
Order, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/lawyerstrump-muslim-ban-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/REB3-BKJ5].
2 See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
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than an in-depth analysis of the merits of the arguments in the cases.
I. Mobilizing in the Wake of the Civil Wars in Central
America
U.S. intervention in the Northern Triangle countries of Central
America—Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—on
behalf of huge corporate interests, particularly the food
conglomerates, is by now a fairly well-understood historical fact.3
However, the ongoing consequences of U.S. interventions, aimed at
suppressing primarily indigenous and popular uprisings that
challenged brutal and entrenched dictatorships, are rarely
understood as directly linked to this historical past.4 Although
direct U.S. government intervention in the politics of the region
began in the 1950s with the U.S. overthrow of the Jacobo Arbenz
government in Guatemala, U.S. support for repressive regimes was
arguably a main factor in exacerbating the civil conflicts across
Central America in the 1980s and 1990s.5 Interventions by the
United States and the civil wars that ensued caused a massive
refugee outflow across the region; approximately 600,000 Central
American refugees fled to the United States during those years, not
counting those seeking refuge in other Central and South American
states as well as Europe.6
3 See, e.g., JASON M. COLBY, THE BUSINESS OF EMPIRE 3–4, 11 (2011); RONALD W.
COX, POWER AND PROFITS: U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 58–59, 116–17, 133–34
(1994).
4 See John H. Coastworth, United States Interventions, REVISTA (2005),
https://revista.drclas.harvard.edu/book/us-foreign-policy-spring-summer-2005
[https://perma.cc/T2H4-ND5R]; CHRISTINA PERKINS, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L
STUDIES PROJECT ON PROSPERITY & DEV., ACHIEVING GROWTH AND SECURITY IN THE
NORTHERN TRIANGLE OF CENTRAL AMERICA (Dec. 2016) (describing historical roots and
current violence and economic instability in Northern Triangle and how it relates to US
intervention and migration).
5 See generally Coastworth, supra note 4 (describing United States interventions
throughout Latin America, dismissing as implausible most claims of security reasons, and
describing theories that economic interests, domestic politics, and “the global strategy
effect” were the true reasons for interventions).
6 The author was fortunate enough to begin her legal work as a pro bono lawyer
with the San Francisco Lawyers’ Committee at the time, then established and directed the
Immigration Project at Public Counsel in Los Angeles. California hosted the vast majority
of the refugees from Central America and was the center of significant mobilization of
lawyers and a pro bono and clinical legal movement to provide representation to the
individual refugees. At the same time, the joint public interest and private law partnership
facilitated productive sharing of legal theories and evidence development that allowed
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U.S. policy, despite the ratification of the Protocol on the Status
of Refugees (Refugee Protocol), was to institutionalize a reading of
the Protocol to deny the vast majority of Central American asylum
cases.7 During the height of the refugee crisis, the grant rate of
Salvadoran claims was about 2%, while for Guatemalans it was
about .05%.8 Mass detention of Central American refugees
followed, including harsh detention in large, newly-built centers
near the border and in remote areas, such as at El Centro and
Florence, Arizona. Government strategies, besides the restrictive
interpretations of U.S./international refugee law and mass
detention, included preventing children from being sponsored by
family members in the United States for release from detention;
huge bonds that few could raise; locating detention centers far from
towns and cities with attorneys, and restricting access to detention
facilities in various ways.9
challenges to biased adjudications to move forward through the courts.
7 See Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 267 (incorporating the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
extending it to cover all who have become refugees, irrespective of the date, and without
geographic limitation). Until new asylum regulations were issued in 1990, all immigration
judges were required to forward copies of every asylum and withholding application to the
Department of State Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA), which
then issued an ‘opinion’ on the validity of the case. See JAMES SILK, U.S. COMM. FOR
REFUGEES, DESPITE A GENEROUS SPIRIT: DENYING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 29–30
(1986). Empirical research on the relationship between the BHRHA opinions and
immigration court decisions concluded that there was almost complete congruence
between the two. Id. at 30. This factor ensured government bias in every asylum
adjudication. See id.; see also Arthur C. Helton, Political Asylum Under the 1980 Refugee
Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 243, 253–54 (1984).
8 Susan Bibler Coutin, Falling Outside: Excavating the History of Central American
Asylum Seekers, 35 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 569, 576 (2011) (noting that denial rates for asylum
applications filed by Salvadorans was 97% and 99% for Guatemalans). Statistics for 1984
reflected a grant rate of 2% for Salvadoran asylum claims; 49% for Polish claims; and 66%
for Iranian claims. See GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-87-33BR, ASYLUM:
UNIFORM APPLICATION OF STANDARDS UNCERTAIN—FEW DENIED OR DEPORTED 1 (1987).
In 1989, the grant rates were 1.9% for Guatemalan claims, 2.3% for Salvadoran claims,
3.5% for Haitian claims. In sharp contrast, during the same period, 81% of Soviet claims
were granted, 65.8% of Ethiopian claims, and 90.9% of the Romanian claims were granted.
The BHRHA advisory opinions heavily weighted the government’s Cold War bias in the
grant rates for all claims for relief from deportation. See id. at 9–10; see also AMNESTY
INT’L, REASONABLE FEAR: HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES REFUGEE POLICY (1990).
9 See generally ROBERT S. KAHN, OTHER PEOPLE’S BLOOD: U.S. IMMIGRATION
PRISONS IN THE REAGAN DECADE (1996) (examining illegal actions by the federal
government in their treatment of refugees fleeing civil wars and death squads in Central
America).
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In response, private and public interest lawyer partnerships
developed to provide pro bono legal representation in the face of
insufficient legal resources for the hundreds of thousands of
individuals who needed representation. Impact litigation
challenging some of the worst policies became more robust because
of the private/public interest partnership. Some of the most
important decisions—both positive and negative—arose from this
effort, such as the class action decisions of American Baptist
Churches v. Thornburgh (ABC v. Thornburgh) on biased
adjudications;10 Flores v. Meese, on the rights of child asylumseekers;11 and Immigration and Naturalization Service v. CardozaFonseca (INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca) on interpreting the standard of
proof in asylum claims.12
On the activism side, lawyers, activists, and church groups
formed partnerships to institutionalize the sanctuary movement,
providing safe havens in towns, cities, and churches to refuse to turn
Central American refugees over to government officials for
detention or deportation.13 Established organizations such as
CARECEN and the Central American solidarity movement
collaborated to spread information in schools, colleges, and
universities, and spurred delegations from the United States to
document first-hand the violence faced by refugees, and to set up
sister cities between United States and Central American cities.14
The international legal strategies within the domestic
framework at the time included arguments interpreting U.S.
obligations under the Refugee Protocol based on international
humanitarian and human rights law, both in individual cases and in
10 American Baptist Church v. Thornburgh, 760 F. Supp. 796 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(approving class action settlement agreement to remedy mass denials of asylum
applications by Guatemalans and Salvadorans by providing for de novo asylum interviews,
stays of deportation, and work authorization).
11 Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v. Reno, CV 85-4544-RJK (C.D. Cal.
Jan. 17, 1997) (agreeing to general policy favoring release of minors and requiring that
children who are detained are placed in the least restrictive setting possible).
12 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (holding that the standard that
applies to asylum claims is “well-founded fear of persecution”).
13 See Coutin, supra note 8 (describing the efforts of sanctuary activists); see also
Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, Nora Hamilton & James Loucky, The Sanctuary Movement and
Central American Activism in Los Angeles, 36 LATIN AM. PERSP. 101, 105–07, 117 (2009)
(outlining the coalitions involved in the sanctuary movement).
14 Chinchilla, Hamilton & Loucky, supra note 13, at 116–18 (describing
CARECEN’s efforts and the movement’s spread to universities).
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the consolidated and class actions.15 These efforts continued into
the Haitian refugee influx, which also precipitated strategies based
on international law, both in individual cases and in class actions
like the Haitian Centers Council litigation brought by Yale and the
Miami advocates.16 In individual asylum and refugee cases,
advocates made international human rights and international
humanitarian law arguments challenging the interpretation of the
grounds of asylum, as well as a range of other practices.
Inevitably, there was backlash: attacks on CARECEN and
CISPES and the broader Central American solidarity movement that
included, for example, breaks-ins and raids on the casefiles of the
Harvard legal clinic, arrests of prominent activists for public
dissent, and various types of threats to solidarity organizations.17
Despite the orchestrated backlash that included targeting by
government entities, both statewide and nationwide challenges
slowed the mass deportation efforts and resulted in the passing of
extended voluntary departure, temporary protection status, and
finally, the Legalization Program of IRCA and NACARA—
providing permanent protection to thousands of Central Americans
15 See In re Medina, No. A26 949 415 (Immigr. Ct., Harlingen, Tex., July 15, 1985),
aff’d on other grounds, Matter of Medina, 19 I. & N. Dec. 734 (BIA 1988). See also In re
Madrid-Norio, No. A24 292 084 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 21, 1987); In re
Aguilar-Moreno, No. A27 196 226 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco, Cal., Oct. 18, 1988); In
re Santos-Gomez, Santos-Trejos and Ramirez-Santos, Nos. A29 564 781, A29 564 785
and A29 564 801 (Immigr. Ct., Washington, D.C., Aug. 24, 1990) (all cited and discussed
in Jennifer Moore, Simple Justice: Humanitarian Law as a Defense to Deportation, 4
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 11, 11, 12, 26 (1991)).
16 Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (holding that the President
is not prohibited by the INA or the Refugee Protocol from ordering the Coast Guard to
intercept people traveling at sea from Haiti to the United States and return them to Haiti
without considering whether they qualify as refugees); Harold Hongju Koh & Michael J.
Wishnie, The Story of Sale v. Haitian Centers Council: Guantanamo and Refoulement, in
HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY STORIES 385–432 (Deena R. Hurwitz et al. eds., 2009)
(explaining the strategies used in Sale and its impact).
17 See Coutin, supra note 8, at 578 (describing prosecutions of activists); Chinchilla,
Hamilton & Loucky, supra note 13, at 107, 109, 117 (describing arrests of Sanctuary
movement activists, warnings to churches to stop offering sanctuary to refugees, and INS
efforts to cut off federal funds to Los Angeles when considered becoming a sanctuary city).
On FBI involvement in raids on activists, legal clinics and others to suppress Central
American activism, see ROSS GELBSPAN, BREAK-INS, DEATH THREATS AND THE FBI: THE
COVERT WAR AGAINST THE CENTRAL AMERICA MOVEMENT 1–3 (1991); see also CHIP
BERLET, THE HUNT FOR RED MENACE: HOW GOVERNMENT INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES &
PRIVATE RIGHT-WING GROUPS TARGET DISSIDENTS & LEFTISTS AS SUBVERSIVE
TERRORISTS & OUTLAWS 4, 62 (1994).
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in the United States and allowing their families to join them and
become residents.18
II. Defending the ‘Secret Evidence’ Cases of the 1990s
Although not the first laws and policies to single out Arab noncitizens as specific targets of law enforcement, in the 1990s the
George H. W. Bush (Bush I) administration began a law
enforcement surveillance and interrogation program that included
fingerprinting all U.S. residents and immigrants of only Arab origin.
The Clinton Administration passed two laws that included measures
with harsh provisions that were almost exclusively enforced against
Arab refugees and immigrants in the United States, the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) of 1996.19 One cluster of cases during this period,
however, was paradigmatic of the government’s selective
enforcement of immigration laws against Arabs and Muslims,
widely known as the ‘secret evidence’ cases. The government’s
strategies in these cases were to use ‘anti-terrorism’ immigration
regulations under IIRIRA and AEDPA to deport, exclude, and
detain Arabs on the basis of evidence that it refused to disclose to
the individuals, their families, or their representatives. IIRIRA
authorized the use of secret evidence in deportation proceedings,
and AEDPA established an Alien Terrorist Removal Court with
specific proceedings to try ‘alien terrorists.’20 In the secret evidence
cases, however, the government sidestepped the restrictions built
into the new proceedings and courts for trying aliens charged on
terrorism-related grounds, and relied on garden-variety immigration
regulations to claim its evidence was classified and non-disclosure
was warranted under the new laws.21

18 See Coutin, supra note 8, at 580–81, 583–85 (explaining how pressure on the INS
led to legal reform).
19 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996); Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). For a good review of the effects of
AEDPA and IIRIRA on Arabs in the United States, see Michael J. Whidden, Unequal
Justice: Arabs in America and United States Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2825 (2001).
20 AEDPA § 303(a), 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2001); AEDPA § 401(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1533
(2003). See IIRIRA § 304 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2000)).
21 A number of the individuals who were charged and detained on secret evidence
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The test case for using immigration regulations to ground the
government’s actions in the secret evidence cases was the 17-year
litigation known as the ‘LA-8.’ The eight LA-8 individuals who
were arrested, detained, and placed in deportation proceedings were
rounded up on the basis of their association with the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), which the government
charged as an organization that advocated ‘doctrines of world
communism.’22 The individuals were seven Palestinians and the
Kenyan wife of one of them—all of whom were students and others
active in the Los Angeles-area on Palestinian rights. The group had
been the subject of FBI surveillance for over three years, and when
the FBI found no evidence of criminal wrongdoing, it turned the
case to Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS),
recommending deportation. The government refused to produce its
evidence in open court, which, when the courts struck down the use
of secret evidence after almost two decades of litigation, turned out
to be nothing more than entirely legal activity protected by the First
Amendment.23 During the course of the LA-8 litigation, the lawyers
defending them were also subjected to FBI surveillance, which they
discovered and challenged in separate proceedings in federal
court.24
While the LA-8 litigation wound its way through the courts—in
the end, all the way to the Supreme Court on a claim of selective
immigration enforcement—the government continued using its

were held for long periods of time, several for three and four years. For a sample of the
decisions, see Al-Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2001); Kiareldeen v. Reno,
71 F. Supp. 2d 402 (D.N.J. 1999); In re Nasser Ahmed, (N.Y., EOIR, Immigr. Ct. May 1,
1996); Haddam v. Reno, 54 F. Supp. 2d 588 (E.D. Va. 1999); Haddam v. Holder, 547 F.
App’x 306 (4th Cir. 2013). The author was co-counsel with Malea Kiblan and Rene
Kathawala in the over 20-year litigation of Anwar Haddam, which ended in a grant of
withholding, but the government continues to attempt to remove Dr. Haddam to Algeria
as of the date of this writing, despite the death sentences against him by both the Algerian
government and the terrorist organization, the Islamic Armed Group (GIA).
22 United States v. Hamide, 914 F.2d 1147, 1148 (9th Cir. 1990).
23 Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999); Am.-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995); Am.-Arab AntiDiscrimination Comm. v. Meese, 714 F. Supp. 1060 (C.D. Cal. 1989), rev’d on other
grounds, Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Thornburgh, 970 F.2d 501 (9th Cir.
1991).
24 See ACLU v. Thornburgh, Civ. Action No. 89-2248 (D.D.C. June 26, 1989), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part sub nom. ACLU Foundation of S. Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).
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secret evidence strategies from that case in about two dozen other
cases. Working together, the INS and the FBI used the immigration
regulations and the claim of terrorism to refuse to disclose evidence,
and proceeded to detain and place in deportation proceedings Arab
and Muslim immigrants without providing the basis for charges
against them. In most of these cases, the litigation focused on
statutory and constitutional due process rights, but in some of the
cases involving asylum claims, the petitioners’ arguments involved
the inconsistency between the application of asylum grounds and
terrorism bars under US and international law.25
III. Mobilizing post-September 11, 2001 for Guantanamo
Detainees
Turning to the third period of relevance, September 11, 2001, it
is often described as an event when ‘everything changed’ in the
United States and the “gloves came off” as Bush administration
officials liked to say.26 That stark before/after characterization
stands to be disputed, as many of the policies that were put in place
immediately after 9/11 had been tested by various government
entities prior to 9/11. Nevertheless, much like the post-Trump
period, policies previously considered to have dubious legality
became normalized.27
Such policies included detentions without trial, using the label
of administrative detention for criminal-related charges (such as
terrorism-related immigration charges); the use of secret evidence
to arrest, detain, and deport immigrants and other non-citizens;28 the
25 For a complete list of these cases and the laws and regulations under which charges
were brought against the individuals involved, see Susan M. Akram, Scheherezade Meets
Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclusion, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 51 (1999).
26 Alan W. Clarke, Rendition to Torture: A Critical Legal History, 62 RUTGERS L.
REV. 1, 22 (2009); William C. Banks, 9/11 Symposium: Five Years On: A Look at the
Global Response to Terrorism: The Death of FISA, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1209, 1240 (2007).
27 See generally Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and
Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the
United States: Is Alienage a Distinction without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609
(2005) (detailing post-9/11 policies and their constitutional implications); Sonia R. Farber,
Forgotten at Guantanamo: The Boumediene Decision and Its Implications for Refugees at
the Base under the Obama Administration, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 989 (2010) (discussing the
treatment of detainees over time, including decisions in Hamdan, Rasul, and Boumediene,
and focusing on refugees still detained there).
28 See Martin Schwartz, Niels Frenzen & Mayra L. Calo, Recent Developments on
the INS’s Use of Secret Evidence Against Aliens, in 2001-02 IMMIGRATION &
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targeting of Arabs and Muslims for ‘special measures’ that were
extralegal or clearly unconstitutional, but mostly upheld by the
courts;29 and mass roundups and mass deportations through
immigration detention without due process.30 In the hysteria that
surrounded these measures, both lawyer and activist mobilization
was difficult and slow, primarily because of the widespread
publicity that all Arabs and Muslims were terrorists because the
9/11 hijackers were Muslim and Arab.31 Legal representation of
individuals held in administrative detention was extremely difficult
because of the incommunicado administrative detention under
which most were held.32 Lawyers, when they could locate clients,
were routinely prevented access, and individuals were denied the
right to call lawyers or their consulates for assistance.33
NATURALIZATION HANDBOOK 300 (2001).
29 Supreme Court Allows Secrecy to Stand in Deportation Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June
29, 2002, at A10.
30 Jim Edwards, Data Show Shoddy Due Process for Post-Sept. 11 Immigration
Detainees, N.J. L.J. 1 (Feb. 4, 2002); William Glaberson, Closed Immigration Hearings
Criticized as Prejudicial, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2001, at B7.
31 See Sahar F. Aziz, Sticks and Stones, the Words That Hurt: Entrenched
Stereotypes Eight Years After 9/11, 13 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 33, 33–34, 37–39 (2009)
(describing how stereotypes of Muslims and Arabs as terrorists became entrenched
following 9/11). See also AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., 1991 REPORT
ON ANTI-ARAB HATE CRIMES (1992); AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM.,
1995 REPORT ON ANTI-ARAB RACISM (1995); AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
COMM., 1996-1997 REPORT ON HATE CRIMES AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ARABAMERICANS (1997); AMERICAN-ARAB ANTI-DISCRIMINATION COMM., 1998-2000 REPORT
ON HATE CRIMES AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ARAB-AMERICANS (2001); Dan Eggen &
Cheryl W. Thompson, US Seeks Thousands Ordered Deported: Middle Eastern Men are
Focus of Search, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2002, at A1; Dan Eggen, Deportee Sweep Will Start
with
Mideast
Focus,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
8,
2002),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/02/08/deportee-sweep-will-startwith-mideast-focus/bab2ff0f-4637-4f34-bcbe-098e75987630/?utm_term=.e7bf83a2c3a6
[https://perma.cc/Z6G5-6GE6].
32 See Illusion of Justice: Human Rights Abuses in US Terrorism Prosecutions, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (July 21, 2014), https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/07/21/illusionjustice/human-rights-abuses-us-terrorism-prosecutions [https://perma.cc/F6CJ-JQT3].
33 OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE SEPTEMBER 11
DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN
CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 130–37 (2003),
available at https://oig.justice.gov/special/0306/full.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS64-R6JP];
OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES’ ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE IN METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER
IN
BROOKLYN,
NEW
YORK
1,
32–33
(2003),
available
at
https://oig.justice.gov/special/0312/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6LC-VPGE]; AMNESTY
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Meanwhile, Guantanamo became a paradigm of its own. As the
United States began transferring individuals to Guantanamo, first
from Afghanistan, then from all over the world, the Administration
announced that the Geneva Conventions would not apply to persons
captured in the war on terror.34 The Office of Legal Counsel issued
a memorandum claiming that no court would have jurisdiction to
hear challenges concerning the detention of anyone held at
Guantanamo.35 One of the main goals of the Bush Administration
in its massive detention strategy was to prevent independent court
review as well as to severely curtail detainees’ access to counsel, in
order to ensure unfettered use of whatever interrogation techniques
it chose to implement. For example, the United States labeled the
Guantanamo prisoners ‘enemy combatants,’36 a term that is found
nowhere in the Geneva Conventions. Other terms the United States
suggested included ‘underprivileged enemy combatants,’37
‘security internees,’38 ‘criminal detainees,’39 ‘persons under U.S.

INT’L, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL’S CONCERNS REGARDING
POST SEPTEMBER 11 DETENTIONS IN THE USA 6–7, 17–18, 20–21 (2002); DOJ Orders
Incentives, ‘Voluntary’ Interviews of Aliens to Obtain Info on Terrorists, 78 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1816, 1817 (2001); Josh Meyer, Dragnet Produces Few Terrorist Ties, L.A.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2001, at A1.
34 See Pentagon: Geneva Convention Doesn’t Cover Detainees, REUTERS (Jan. 11,
2002), http://www.crimelynx.com/nogen.html [https://perma.cc/MQV6-YPVL]; see also
HUM. RTS. WATCH, A POLICY TO EVADE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2004),
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/usa0604/2.htm#_ftn4 [https://perma.cc/NKJ4-E9MX].
35 See Letter from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1,
2001),
available
at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2010/08/05/memo-gonzalesaug1.pdf [https://perma.cc/FH6A-S96X].
36 See, e.g., Andrew Morgan, Guantanamo Bay: Military Commissions and Enemy
Combatants, JURIST (July 20, 2013), https://www.jurist.org/archives/feature/guantanamobay-military-commissions-and-enemy-combatants/ [https://perma.cc/S6HX-B9HK].
37 See DEPT. OF ARMY INSPECTOR GENERAL, REPORT ON DETAINEE OPERATIONS 45–
47
(July
21,
2004)
[hereinafter
DAIG
REPORT],
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/daig_detaineeops_21jul2004.pdf [https://perma.cc/XFK9-8DNJ].
38 See Maj. Gen. George R. Fay, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Detention
Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade 8 (2004), reprinted in THE TORTURE
PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 1018 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds.,
2005).
39 Id.
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forces control,’40 and ‘low-level enemy combatants.’41 These terms
are unrelated to any of the recognized international legal categories:
prisoners of war;42 civilian internees;43 or non-privileged
belligerents.44 By avoiding the international-consensus application
of the Geneva Conventions, the United States managed to avoid
providing the Guantanamo detainees the fundamental protections
entitled to persons in any of the recognized categories: military trials
with fundamental due process for combatants accused of war crimes
or release at termination of hostilities; civilian trials with full due
process for non-combatants charged with crimes and immediate
release for those found not to be a threat to the security of the United
States; and, critically, protections against torture and cruel, inhuman
and degrading, treatment or punishment.45 To that end, the United
States maintained that the only rules applying to the prisoners on
Guantanamo were those in the 13 November 2001 Military Order
on the Detention, Treatment and Trial in the War Against Terrorism,
which allowed detainees to be detained indefinitely without charge
or trial, or to be tried before a military commission.46 The Order did
not permit any of the detainees’ access to the civilian courts within
the United States, or to any other type of relief.47
Most troubling, as the comprehensive study conducted by Seton
DAIG REPORT, supra note 37, at 45–47.
41 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 513 (2004) (“enemy combatant”); Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 431 (2004) (“enemy combatant”); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 570 (2006) (“enemy combatant” and “underprivileged belligerent”); Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 732 (2008) (“enemy combatant”).
42 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
43 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of
War arts. 79–96, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
44 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note
42, art. 5.
45 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note
42, arts. 5, 17, 84, 118; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, supra note 43, arts. 3, 71, 118, 132–33. For gaps between the U.S.
constitutional framework and fundamental international law protections highlighted in the
Guantanamo cases, see Susan M. Akram, Do Constitutions Make a Difference as regards
the Protection of fundamental Human Rights? Comparing the United States and Israel, in
THE DYNAMICS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (Frishman &
Muller eds., 2010).
46 Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 13, 2001).
47 Id. at § 7.
40
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Hall in 2006 illustrated, the vast majority of the detainees picked up
in Afghanistan and elsewhere and transferred to Guantanamo had
no involvement in hostilities against the United States.48 This is
reflected in the cases: only ten of the approximately 800 detainees
held at Guantanamo since 2001 were charged with crimes, while the
rest were denied the right to civilian trials and either held without
charge or ultimately transferred to other countries for trial or further
detention. Most were transferred or released to other countries by
2009. As of the date of this writing, 40 detainees remain on
Guantanamo.49
In the first year or so after September 11, the burden fell on
organizations such as the Center for Constitutional Rights, the
National Lawyers Guild, and the American Civil Liberties Union to
represent both individuals held in the United States and on
Guantanamo arrested in the ‘war on terror,’ until private law firms
started to understand the stakes involved in the cases and issues.
Much like in the earlier secret evidence cases, one of the main
challenges to defending both individuals rounded up in the post9/11 Arab and Muslim detention and deportation cases and in the
Guantanamo cases was the extreme secrecy and prevention of
access lawyers faced in identifying and communicating with the
clients.
In addition to attempting to use substantive international law
arguments in the litigation, defense lawyers also tried to use
international human rights mechanisms to implement the Supreme
Court decisions that international law did apply to the detainees.
These included attempts to seek access to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to conduct refugee status
determinations at Guantanamo; to address the United Nations
special mechanisms to request access to Guantanamo, conduct

48 See generally MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, THE GUANTANAMO
DETAINEES: THE GOVERNMENT’S STORY (2006) (55% of the detainees committed no
hostile acts against the United States; only 5 % were seized on the battlefield; 86% were
turned over to U.S. custody by Pakistani or Afghan individuals for a $5,000 bounty per
head; out of the over 700 people who have been at Guantanamo, only 10 have been charged
with crimes).
49 See Facts about the Transfer of Guantanamo Detainees, HUM. RTS. FIRST,
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/guantanamo-numbers
[https://perma.cc/8M4D-SDCT]; see also Guantanamo by the Numbers, AM. C.L. UNION,
https://www.aclu.org/issues/national-security/detention/guantanamo-numbers
[https://perma.cc/UJZ4-QB9D].
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investigations and issue their own reports; and other efforts at the
Human Rights Council and the treaty bodies—particularly the
Committees for the Conventions on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) and on Civil and Political Rights (HRC).
These efforts resulted in a flurry of outstanding United Nations
Special Rapporteur reports, concluding observations and other
interventions by the human rights mechanisms, but had basically no
effect on U.S. policy or actions.50 Ultimately, the lawyers never
succeeded in getting UNHCR access to Guantanamo, or any traction
on conducting refugee status determinations in cases where
resettlement might have been an option. Although post-2004, there
was growing legal mobilization for the Guantanamo detainees, there
have been few victories and many long-lasting defeats.
IV. The Questionable Success of International Legal Strategies
This section explores generally the use of international legal
strategies in the relevant periods to answer the question: how did
the international legal strategies attempted by U.S. lawyers fare in
these two prior periods presaging the current policies and
immigration climate?

50 See, e.g., Joint Study on Global Practices in Relation to Secret Detention in the
Context of Countering Terrorism of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, the
Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the Working Group on
Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 48–53, 65, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/13/42 (Jan. 26,
2010); Leila Zerrougui, Chairperson-Rapporteur of the Working Group on Arbitrary
Detention, Leandro Despouy, Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers, Manfred Nowak, Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Asma Jahangir, Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Religion or Belief, & Paul Hunt, Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, Situation of
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120 (Feb. 27, 2006); see also
Statement of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Torture at the Expert Meeting on
the Situation of Detainees Held at the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay (Oct. 3, 2013),
available
at
https://newsarchive.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13859
&LangID=E [https://perma.cc/6G2U-3JMC] (noting that the 2006 joint report “contains
many conclusions and recommendations that are regrettably still relevant due to a lack of
implementation by the government”).
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A. International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in
Refugee Claims in the 1980’s and 1990s.
In re Medina, brought before the Immigration Court in
Harlingen, Texas, was the first case based on a claim that
deportation of an asylum-seeker to El Salvador, a country embroiled
in violent civil conflict, violated U.S. obligations under the Fourth
Geneva Convention and Article 33 of the Refugee Protocol. The
applicant, Jesus del Carmen Medina, sought asylum and
withholding of deportation (withholding of removal under current
law) on the grounds that since El Salvador was in violation of
Article 3 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV), and the United
States was a party to the treaty, the United States was required under
its Article 1 not to return her there.51 She argued that both under
GCIV and under customary international law, since El Salvador was
in gross violation of humanitarian law rules which the United States
was bound to respect, it must, at a minimum, withhold her
deportation to the place engaging in such gross violations of
humanitarian law. The immigration judge, surprisingly, agreed that
GCIV applied, that Article 3 governed the obligations of El
Salvador in the non-international armed conflict there, and that the
United States, also a State Party, was required to provide relief in
deportation proceedings under its Article 1 obligations. The judge
also found that GCIV was self-executing, and that he had the
authority to apply GCIV on deportability. However, he denied her
request for asylum and withholding on the grounds that there was
insufficient evidence of violations of international humanitarian law
occurring in El Salvador. On appeal, the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) affirmed the denial of asylum and withholding, but
on the basis that the Fourth Geneva Convention was not selfexecuting, and there was no corollary customary law protection for

51

In re Medina, No. A26 949 415 (Immigr. Ct., Harlingen, Tex., July 15, 1985), aff’d
on other grounds, Matter of Medina, 19 I. & N. 734 (BIA 1988). Medina testified that
many Salvadoran civilians were afraid of getting caught up in the violent military conflict
between government and insurgent forces in El Salvador and were subjected to brutal
treatment or killed. Id. at 4. See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, supra note 42, art. 3 (“In the case of armed conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to
the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum … (1) Persons taking no active part in
the hostilities … shall be in all circumstances treated humanely”); see id. at art. 1 (“The
High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present
Convention in all circumstances.”).
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relief other than what was codified in the INA. It also held that an
immigration judge has no authority to consider any relief not
explicitly authorized within the immigration statute and
regulations.52
Following the first Medina decision, lawyers around the country
began developing arguments for asylum and withholding based on
claims that Central American refugees were fleeing flagrant
violations of international humanitarian law.53 After the Medina
decision, the San Francisco immigration court decided two claims
for asylum and withholding under similar arguments raised in the
Medina case—that this relief was equivalent to a binding
humanitarian law norm of ‘temporary refuge.’ In the cases In re
Madrid-Norio and In re Aguilar-Moreno, the immigration court
agreed that despite rampant violations of humanitarian law in El
Salvador, the United States had no obligations under either GCIV
or customary international law to grant relief from deportation to
persons fleeing the civil war there.54 In contrast, in In re SantosGomez, Washington D.C. Immigration Court Judge Nejelski
granted the applicants relief on the temporary refuge argument on
the basis that returning them to civil war would violate a customary
international law obligation binding the United States not to return
someone to risk of “murder, rape and destruction.” Despite the
BIA’s ruling in Medina denying claims for relief under
humanitarian law, the judge in Santos-Gomez explicitly found that
U.S. immigration judges had jurisdiction to consider customary
international law claims, and indeed, had an obligation to do so.
The Santos-Gomez decision gained no traction, however, as
humanitarian law arguments in support of claims for asylum,
52 See In re Medina, No. A26 949 415 (Immigr. Ct., Harlingen, Tex., July 15, 1985),
aff’d on other grounds, Matter of Medina, 19 I. & N. 734 (BIA 1988). Matter of
Medina, Interim
Decision
3078
(BIA
1988)
available
at
https://www.refworld.org/cases,USA_BIA,3ae6b6b14.html [https://perma.cc/S8HXGM5N ]. The author is indebted to the work of Jennifer Moore whose excellent analysis
informs this discussion. See Moore, supra note 15.
53 These arguments were developed in large part due to the work of Karen Parker,
whose expertise was invaluable for lawyers around the country in making their claims for
temporary refuge. See Karen Parker, Geneva Convention Protections for Salvadoran
Refugees: An International Law Defense Against Deportation and a Justification for
Sanctuary, 13 IMMIGR. NEWSL. 7 (1984).
54 In re Madrid-Norio, No. A24 292 084 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 21,
1987); In re Aguilar-Moreno, No. A27 196 226 (Immigr. Ct., San Francisco, Cal., Oct. 18,
1988) (cited by Moore, supra note 15).
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temporary refuge, and protection for refugees were firmly rejected
by the federal courts.55 In Echeverria-Hernandez, the petitioner
sought relief from deportation on the temporary refuge argument
under customary international law, rather than the treaty argument
based on GCIV. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the
argument that temporary refuge for persons fleeing civil war had
ripened into a customary law rule, as the petitioner had not proved
that countries applying such a norm did so on the basis of opinio
juris.56 Critically, the Court ruled that the 1980 Refugee Act was
the complete codification of U.S. law on admission of refugees, and
any other international law norm was, therefore, precluded.57
In several cases that arose from civil society activism related to
the civil wars, respondents/petitioners relied on international legal
arguments to advance their claims. In the nationwide class action
litigation American Baptist Churches v. Meese (ABC v. Meese), the
petitioners claimed that prosecutions of sanctuary organizations and
individuals involved in the sanctuary movement to prevent
deportation of Central American refugees violated GCIV
obligations and the customary norm of temporary refuge.58 The
District Court ruled that there was no binding norm of temporary
refuge under international law that protected persons fleeing armed
conflict; moreover, the 1980 Refugee Act precluded such claims.59
The ABC case ended in a settlement that terminated the
deportation of Salvadoran and Guatemalan class members pending
adjudication or re-adjudication of their asylum claims, and required
that they be released from immigration detention, among other
stipulations. However, the settlement was reached on the strength
of the Court’s findings that Central American asylum claims were
routinely decided on discriminatory and ideologically-biased
grounds that violated the United States’ immigration laws and not
on any international law ground.60 The Ninth Circuit reached

55 See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d 1436, 1454 (9th Cir. 1989); American
Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 770–71 (N.D. Cal. 1989);
Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS, 923 F.2d 688, 693–94 (9th Cir. 1991); Bradvica v. INS, 128
F.3d 1009 (7th Cir. 1997).
56 See Echeverria-Hernandez v. INS, 923 F.2d at 693.
57 See id. at 694.
58 ABC v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. at 756.
59 See id. at 771.
60 Id. at 756.
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similar conclusions in U.S. v. Aguilar and affirmed the criminal
convictions of activists involved in the sanctuary movement under
the ‘harboring of aliens’ statute.61 The Aguilar defendants appealed
their convictions on grounds that their actions in defense of Central
American refugees were protected under the Refugee Protocol as
well as international norms governing the rights of individuals to
refuge from civil war. The Ninth Circuit rejected both the
customary international and treaty-based arguments—finding that
even though the United States was a party to the Refugee Protocol,
the treaty was not self-executing. Thus, the United States had no
international legal obligations towards refugees other than to the
extent of the Refugee Protocol’s incorporation into the INA.62
The Supreme Court weighed in on several key arguments for
refugees and asylum-seekers during this period. In three main
cases, INS v. Stevic, INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, and Sale v. Haitian
Centers Council, the Supreme Court addressed claims on behalf of
refugees and asylum-seekers seeking to interpret United States
immigration law and its codification of the Refugee Protocol in a
manner consistent with international standards. In INS v. Stevic, the
Supreme Court was asked to interpret the obligation of nonrefoulement and the scope of Articles 33 and Article 1(A)(2) under
the Refugee Protocol.63 The respondent claimed that United States
codification of these provisions in the INA as withholding of
deportation and asylum had to be interpreted consistently with the
international consensus on the scope of Articles 33 and 1(A)(2).64
He claimed these provisions had a generous meaning under
international law—relying on the UNHCR Handbook and other
See United States v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1436.
Id. at 1454.
63 INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407 (1984).
64 Withholding of deportation has been amended several times and is now termed
withholding of removal. The version at issue in the Stevic case prohibited deportation of
an alien ‘to a country [where his/her] life or freedom would be threatened . . . on account
of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.’
See I.N.A. § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976). Political asylum is governed by I.N.A. §
208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), which authorizes the Attorney General to grant asylum to any
alien who is unable or unwilling to return to his country because of ‘persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or
membership in a particular social group.’ For reasons peculiar to his case and governing
law, Stevic was not eligible to apply for asylum, but was seeking an interpretation of the
relief of withholding that was the equivalent of the ‘well-founded fear’ standard for
asylum.
61
62
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evidence of international consensus and state practice—and that all
persons who qualify as a ‘refugee’ were entitled to non-refoulement,
the core obligation of all States Parties under the Refugee
Convention and Protocol. The Supreme Court rejected the
international law arguments, finding that the scope of United States
obligations under the Protocol were only as incorporated in the INA,
and that not all refugees are entitled to non-refoulement under
United States law. The Court found that the clear difference in
language between the two statutory provisions meant that to be
eligible for withholding of deportation an alien had to prove his/her
life or freedom would be threatened—a ‘clear probability of
persecution’ standard, while for asylum, s/he had to meet a lesser
standard of ‘well-founded fear of persecution.’65
Three years later, the Supreme Court addressed the question left
open by Stevic, which was: what exactly is required to prove the
‘well-founded fear of persecution’ standard for asylum? In INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, the respondent claimed that the well-founded
fear standard was different and required a far lower standard of
proof than withholding, and that based on her claim, she was
entitled to asylum.66 The Court agreed with the respondent. In what
seemed like a deeper review of international law, the Court referred
to the UNHCR Handbook and international and comparative legal
experts to interpret the meaning of the Refugee Convention and
Protocol. Although the outcome was favorable for the respondent,
the Court’s analysis and international legal interpretive
methodology remained deeply flawed, and moved U.S. refugee
jurisprudence farther away from international practice, as discussed
further below.
The third case in this Supreme Court trilogy concerned Haitian
refugees and continued the flawed interpretation of the prior two
cases on international law in the protection of asylum-seekers. In
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, refugees fleeing the repressive
policies of the Duvalier dictatorship in Haiti challenged the routine
interception of their boats by U.S. coast guard cutters on the high
seas and the summary return of refugees to Haiti.67 The question
before the Supreme Court was whether the non-refoulement
provision in Refugee Protocol Article 33(1) prohibited the United
65
66
67

INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 425, 430.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993).
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States from interdicting refugees on the high seas and returning
them to a country from which they feared persecution; in other
words, whether the non-refoulement obligation has extraterritorial
application. The Supreme Court ruled that neither Article 33 of the
Refugee Protocol nor the INA precluded the United States from
intercepting refugees in international waters and returning them,
even to a risk of persecution. The Court’s analysis relied on a
limited review of the travaux preparatoires of the Refugee
Convention, but its reading, and ultimate interpretation of the
provision at issue, was the opposite of the interpretation provided
by the UNHCR and other international authorities in their amicus
briefs in the case.68
B. International Human Rights Law in the Secret Evidence
Cases of the 1990s
There were few international legal arguments raised in the two
dozen secret evidence cases litigated in immigration proceedings in
the aftermath of the passage of IIRIRA and AEDPA, and none on
the challenge to the use of secret evidence. Reviewing just a few of
the cases illustrates the reasons that international legal arguments
were rarely raised to litigate the claims, and when such arguments
were raised, why they received no traction in the courts.
The two respondents who were detained for the longest period
of time on secret evidence were Mazen al-Najjar and Anwar
Haddam—held for four-and-a-half years and close to four years
respectively. Al-Najjar’s counsel did not rely on international law,
but Anwar Haddam’s did at various stages of the two decades of
litigating his case. Mazen al-Najjar was a Palestinian refugee from
Gaza who had lived in the United States for 18 years prior to his
arrest in 1997. He had entered initially as a student, obtained
Masters and Doctorate degrees, married and had three U.S. citizen
children with whom he was residing in Tampa. He worked in a
think tank at the University of South Florida, the World and Islam
Studies Enterprise (WISE), and was the editor-in-chief of its
journal.69 In a pattern eerily similar to the LA-8 case, the FBI

68 Id. at 190–98 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Brief of the Office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, McNary
v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (No. 92-344).
69 See Al Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1329 (S.D. Fla. 2000). See Akram, supra
note 25, at 71–77.
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targeted the Muslim community in Tampa for surveillance for four
years for evidence of connections to ‘terrorist groups’ in the Middle
East. When no such evidence was found, the investigation was
terminated, but several individuals were turned over to INS for
deportation proceedings, including al-Najjar and his brother-in-law,
Sami al-Arian.70 In immigration proceedings on deportability for
visa overstay, al-Najjar and his wife were denied asylum. A few
days after the decision, FBI and INS agents arrested al-Najjar based
on classified information of connections with Middle Eastern
terrorist organizations, and he was held without bond for posing a
threat to national security.71 Three and a half years in detention
later, al-Najjar was released without being given information about
the charges or evidence against him. A few months later, he was rearrested and deported to an undisclosed country in 2002.72
Al-Najjar’s case, like many of the secret evidence cases of this
period, was based on evidence he was never able to challenge, and
which ultimately proved to be grounded solely on association with
alleged terrorists, on the basis of evidence provided by untested and
unreliable ex parte witnesses.73 Al-Najjar’s challenge to the use of
secret evidence to deny bond was ultimately successful on due
process grounds, but not until two years into his detention, in habeas
proceedings in federal district court. Despite the finding by the
district court that using classified information against al-Najjar was
a violation of due process, and that ‘mere association’ with alleged
terrorist organizations was insufficient to find him a threat to
national security, the court did not order his release.74
Anwar Haddam’s case also reflects the insufficiencies of
constitutional and statutory-based arguments in challenging the use
of secret evidence. Anwar Haddam was an Algerian politician
elected to Parliament in the first free elections in Algeria in its
history, which brought his party, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS),
70 For an exposé of the FBI investigation into WISE and background into the Tampa
and other Arab and Muslim secret evidence cases, see John F. Sugg, Secret Evidence, 32
THE LINK 1 (1999), available at http://ameu.org/getattachment/fd3114f0-2b78-466e-bf36b7a65d7b266c/Secret-Evidence.aspx [https://perma.cc/D6H5-5BJM].
71 Al Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1333–34.
72 See Rachel La Corte, Deported Ex-Academic Reunited with Family, MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 6, 2003, at B3.
73 See Sugg, supra note 70 (describing the connections between Israeli consular
officials and the investigation and targeting of the staff of WISE).
74 See Al Najjar v. Reno, 97 F. Supp. 2d at 1356–57, 1361–62.
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to power in 1991. When the military staged a coup and overthrew
the civilian government, the FIS President, and other elected
members of Parliament were rounded up, detained, killed, or placed
under house arrest. FIS supporters were also rounded up by the
thousands, arrested, interned in concentration camps where they
were tortured and killed, launching a brutal civil war that lasted until
2002. Haddam was able to flee the country, and entered the United
States in 1992, with his wife and three children, two of whom were
United States citizens, and applied for asylum. In December, 1996,
he was detained, placed in removal (then-exclusion) proceedings,
and charged with being a ‘persecutor of others’ on undisclosed
evidence.75 In the litigation over his asylum claim, the persecutor
of others bar and his detention, his attorneys challenged the use of
secret evidence on due process and constitutional grounds.76 The
BIA, in two decisions, ultimately reviewed the secret evidence and
found it unpersuasive to support a claim that Dr. Haddam was a
persecutor of others because the evidence was insufficient to show
that he had ‘ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in
the persecution of any person.’ The BIA found that the
government’s interpretation of the persecutor of others ground was
based solely on his speech, association or silence, and was an
impermissible interpretation.77
Throughout the case, Haddam’s attorneys challenged the
interpretation of the persecutor of others bar on statutory,
75 During his four years of detention, Dr. Haddam had three immigration court
proceedings, two appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals, in which he was granted
asylum, two habeas corpus actions to seek his release, an extraordinary intervention by
Attorney General Ashcroft who overturned his grant of asylum. Following his release, his
case was appealed to the Fourth Circuit and then remanded for further immigration
proceedings, ultimately resulting in the denial of asylum but a grant of withholding of
removal over 20 years after the case began.
76
The INA includes several bars to a grant of asylum, including the “persecutor of
others” bar, which was at issue in the Haddam case. The bar prohibits the grant of
asylum to an individual who ‘ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.’ Other bars include: (1) conviction of a
“particularly serious crime” such that the applicant is a danger to the United Sates, (2)
committing a “serious non political crime” outside the United States, (3) posing a danger
to the Security of the United States, or (4) being resettled in another country before
arriving in the United States. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGR. SERVS., Asylum Bars,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/asylum-bars
[https://perma.cc/JC7K-2S7E].
77
Matter of A-H-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 774, 777–78 (A.G. 2005) (citing Matter of A-H(BIA 2000)).
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constitutional and international law grounds. At the BIA and in the
Fourth Circuit, counsel argued that the persecutor of others bar
under the INA was based on the Refugee Protocol and therefore
must be interpreted consistently with its equivalent, the Protocol’s
Article 1(F).78 This provision has developed into customary
international law practice, as discussed in the authoritative review
found in UNHCR guidance.79 Counsel cited a range of international
cases on the interpretation of the equivalent of the United States
persecutor of others ground in Article 1(F) to show that three main
elements must be met for an individual to be barred from asylum on
this ground, none of which were met in the Haddam case.80 The
BIA assessed and reviewed the international law argument and
cases cited by Haddam’s counsel and found that United States law
was consistent with the international law norms underlying Article
1(F). Ultimately, although the Fourth Circuit agreed with the
interpretation of the persecutor of others ground—and found for
Haddam on this basis—its decision was based squarely on domestic,
primarily Fourth Circuit, law and not international law.81
Unfortunately, the Circuit Court affirmed the decision to deny
Haddam asylum in the immigration judge’s discretion. Haddam’s
challenges to the use of secret evidence were not successful,
illustrating that neither due process nor the First Amendment were
sufficient constitutional grounds to overcome the broad discretion
given the government in immigration proceedings.
Although some of the cases resulted in the courts disallowing
the government’s reliance on secret evidence or requiring release of
the evidence—including after in camera review revealed it was
erroneously classified in the first place—none of the courts struck
78

Id. at 783–86; Haddam v. Holder, No. 547 F. App’x 306, 309–13 (4th Cir. 2013).
See U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, Background Note on the Application
of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees, Annex C (2003), available at https://www.un.org/sc/ctc/news/document/unhcrbackground-note-on-the-application-of-the-exclusion-clauses-article-1f-of-the-1951convention-relating-to-the-status-of-refugees/ [https://perma.cc/5JXC-3QV4].
80 Under international jurisprudence, the elements which must be met to be barred as
a persecutor under Article 1(F) are that the individual must: (1) be a member of an
organization which has committed international offences as a continuous and regular part
of its operation; (2) have personal and knowing participation in the offences; and (3) have
failed to dissociate himself from the organization at the earliest safe opportunity. See
Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 89 D.L.R. (4th) 173 (Fed.
Ct. App. Can. 1992).
81 See Haddam v. Holder, 547 F. App’x 306 (4th Cir. 2013).
79
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down the underlying legal provisions on which the government
rested its claim of secrecy as facially unconstitutional. Moreover,
legislation to repeal the use of secret evidence in immigration
proceedings has so far been unsuccessful, while its use has
expanded post 9/11, under the USA PATRIOT Act and under
various other provisions used in the Guantanamo cases.82
C. International Human Rights Protections in Guantanamo
Detainee Cases Post-9/11
The three major cases that came before the United States
Supreme Court concerning Guantanamo detainees started in June
2004, and are particularly relevant to the efforts at incorporating
international human rights and humanitarian law arguments to
establish rights for the detainees. The first was Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld.83 Hamdi, an American citizen, was seized in Afghanistan
and detained by American military as an ‘enemy combatant.’ The
Court decided not only the constitutional question of lawful
detention but also the application of international humanitarian law
to enemy combatant classification.84 In the second case, Rumsfeld
v. Padilla, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition on
jurisdictional grounds, not reaching the substantive question of
whether a U.S. citizen could be held without due process by the
executive as an ‘enemy combatant.’85
The third and most important case on whether international
human rights law applied to the detainees was Rasul v. Bush,
82 See, e.g., Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, § 412, 115 Stat. 272
(2001) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(3) (Supp. I 2001). See Stephen Townley, The Use
and Misuse of Secret Evidence in Immigration Cases: A Comparative Study of the United
States, Canada and the United Kingdom, 32 YALE J. INT’L. L. 219 (2007).
83 See generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that the Executive
Branch may constitutionally detain “enemy combatants”).
84 The Court’s decision was a mixed bag; on the one hand, the plurality (O’Connor,
CJ Rehnquist, Kennedy and Breyer) found that Hamdi’s detention was lawful and that the
Constitution permits executive detention, without triggering criminal process, of enemy
combatants. On the other hand, the Court went on to hold that the military’s proceedings
were deficient, and that certain minimum due process requirements had to be met, such as
notice of the factual basis for Hamdi’s classification as an enemy combatant, and fair
opportunity to rebut the Government’s assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.
85 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (holding habeas corpus jurisdiction only
reaches the “district of confinement,” including when military had custody of the detainee
as an “enemy combatant”).
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involving habeas petitions filed by the lawyers of a number of the
Guantanamo detainees.86 The Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the
federal courts did have jurisdiction to hear the habeas claims of the
detainees, as well as other related claims under domestic and, more
important, international law.87 The Court rejected the Bush
Administration’s argument that the United States did not have
jurisdiction over Guantanamo, stating that the detainees were under
the ‘complete and exclusive control and jurisdiction’ of the United
States, no other state’s laws applied to them, and they did have a
right to challenge that their “custody. . .[was in] violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”88
Of course, there was immediate pushback by the Bush
Administration, which quickly established the Combatant Status
Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to circumvent the habeas proceedings
in federal courts. The Supreme Court decided two later cases on
Guantanamo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld89 and Boumediene v. Bush.90 In
2006, the Court decided in Hamdan that although the government
could establish military commissions, they had to conform to the
international laws of war and to requirements on courts martial
under the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice.91 The
Commissions, as constituted, did neither, and hence were
unlawful.92 The final case decided by the Supreme Court in the
86 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (holding that the federal courts have
jurisdiction to hear claims on the legality of the detention of detainees in Guantanamo Bay,
a territory over which the US “exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not
‘ultimate sovereignty’”).
87 Id. at 472–73 (describing petitioners’ claims of violations of domestic and
international law and reversing a decision that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction
over these claims).
88 Id. at 480, 494–95, 498–99 (detailing why detention on Guantanamo Bay is subject
to federal court jurisdiction).
89 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (holding that that the military
commission that tried a Guantanamo Bay detainee did not have power to move forward
because its structure and procedures violated the US Uniform Code of Military Justice and
the Geneva Conventions).
90 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (finding the Military Commissions Act
of 2006 acted to unconstitutionally suspend the writ of habeas corpus, as procedures set
up by the to review the status of detainees at Guantanamo were inadequate to substitute
for habeas corpus).
91 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. at 592–95 (explaining why the President’s
power to convene military commissions is subject to the limitation of the U.S. Uniform
Code of Military Justice and the law of war).
92 See id. at 567 (“[W]e conclude that the military commission convened to try
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Guantanamo litigation during this period was Boumediene v. Bush,
which found unlawful the procedures set up by Congress in the
Military Commissions and the Military Commissions Act of 2006.93
Congress has had the last word, however, and the
military commissions under the latest version of the military
commission’s law are the only courts adjudicating the remaining
Guantanamo cases.94
While the domestic habeas litigation and other challenges were
making their way through United States domestic courts, a parallel
battle was being waged in the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on
behalf of the Guantanamo detainees. The IACHR’s interventions
began as early as 2002 with the issuance of the first precautionary
measures on behalf of all the detainees.95 In Detainees at
Guantanamo Bay, the Commission reviewed claims that the
arbitrary, incommunicado and prolonged detention, unlawful
interrogation, and trials by military commission violated the
American Declaration to which the United States was bound. It
ordered precautionary measures against the United States, requiring
that the detainees’ status be adjudicated through a competent

Hamdan lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate both the
UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions.”).
93 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. at 733, 736 (finding that the Military Commissions
Act of 2006 barred federal courts’ jurisdiction over habeas corpus actions of Guantanamo
detainees, with no adequate substitute).
94 See Military Commissions Act of 2009, 10 U.S.C. § 948 et seq. (2012). What we
now know about the Guantanamo detainees has been revealed through the hard work of
lawyers, intrepid journalists, activists, and a few of the detainees themselves who have
managed to publish their stories. Among the critical information: 55% of the detainees
have committed no hostile acts against the US; only 5% of the detainees were seized and
taken into custody by US personnel on the battlefield; 86% of the detainees were arrested
and turned into US military custody by Pakistani or Afghan individuals for a $5,000 bounty
per head; of the over 700 people who have gone through Guantanamo as prisoners, only
10 have been charged with war crimes. The remaining hundreds of detainees were not
charged with any crimes, and about 40 are now in their 16th year of detention at
Guantanamo under the Executive’s claim that they are enemy combatants and can be held
indefinitely or until the end of the global war on terrorism—whenever that might be. See
Guantanamo
by
the
Numbers,
HUM.
RTS.
FIRST
(2012),
https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/resource/guantanamo-numbers
[https://perma.cc/EC5C-YRWL].
95 Persons Detained by the United States in Guantanamo Bay, Provisional Measures,
Report No. 259/02, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (2002); extension of PM 259/02 (2005);
extension of PM 259/02 (2013).
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tribunal. The United States ignored the precautionary measures and
rejected the Commission’s jurisdiction. The Commission continued
to renew its precautionary measures multiple times, up to ten years
after their first issuance. In addition to the collective precautionary
measures, the IACHR issued precautionary measures in the
individual Guantanamo detainee cases of Omar Khadr, Djamel
Ameziane, and Moath al-Alwi, and heard and granted a number of
individual petitions from the detainees. The Commission held
multiple hearings over the years on the rights of the detainees,
conditions of detention, and access to judicial review. It also
repeatedly requested access to Guantanamo Bay to monitor the
conditions of detention. All IACHR interventions were refused or
rejected by the United States.96
Despite the constitutional foundation for the decisions in Rasul
and Hamdi, the U.S. Constitution provided minimal support for the
detainees’ claims. The Court did not even address the torture claims,
as the cases were fundamentally about the lack of access to judicial
review. The strength of the Supreme Court’s decisions and the
constitutional rights involved were undermined by the executive
and legislative actions that instituted parallel adjudications through
the CSRTs that failed to provide the minimal due process guarantees
that the Geneva Conventions and international law would require.
The international legal arguments were ultimately unable to change
the outcomes for the Guantanamo litigants, either, particularly on
the fundamental norm to be free from torture. The prohibition
against torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment is unquestionably a jus cogens norm—prohibited for all
states under all circumstances.97 The Convention against Torture
prohibits both the use of torture and the removal, transfer or
extradition of a person to any country where she risks being
96 See INTER-AM. COMM’N H.R., TOWARDS THE CLOSURE OF GUANTANAMO, U.N.
Doc. OAS/Ser.L/V/II Doc. 20/15 (June 3, 2015).
97 See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and
Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949; 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75
U.N.T.S. 287; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment arts. 1, 16, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; U.S. CONST. art. 8.
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subjected to torture. U.N. bodies and experts reinforced the cluster
of obligations underpinning the prohibition of torture with respect
to the Guantanamo detainees, including the prohibition of
incommunicado detention, the use of evidence obtained by torture,
and the requirement to prosecute and punish all those officials
engaged in torture.98 While the binding nature of the obligations is
clear, the United States instituted policies intended to circumvent its
obligations not to engage in torture and used the DOJ’s OLC, DOD
and military orders as cover to undermine its international
commitment not to torture. Although the official ‘torture policy’
was rescinded by the Obama Administration,99 no official has been
charged for engaging in torture, and many of the policies
circumventing robust review of detainee treatment remain in place
as of this writing.
V. Limitations to the Use of International law in Refugee and
Immigration Cases
In reviewing the outcomes of the strategies that have been tried,
one can only conclude that the news is disheartening. In some ways
it seems that the gains that were made on some of the strategies have
been reversed; in other ways it seems that some of these hard-fought
victories have been completely wiped out and advocates must start
again. For the Central American cases, international legal
arguments got no traction, even in that most immigration-friendly
of courts, the Ninth Circuit. The outcome of the Haitian refugee
litigation was similarly dismal for both the applicants and for
adherence to international legal interpretations of the Refugee
98 See, e.g., LEILA ZERROUGUI ET AL., UN WORKING GROUP ON ARBITRARY
DETENTION, SITUATION OF THE DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120
(2006); see also Letter from Juan Mendez, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, Ben
Emmerson, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counterterrorism, Monica
Pinto, U.N. Special Rapporteur on Indep. of the Judiciary, Seong-Phil Hong, ChairRapporteur of the U.N. Working Grp. on Arbitrary Det., and Michael Georg Link, Dir. of
the OSCE Office for Democratic Insts. and Human Rights to the Gov’t of the U.S. on the
Occasion of the 14th Anniversary of the Opening of the Guantanamo Bay Detention
Facility,
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/SRTorture/OpenLetterGTMOJan11_2016.docx
[https://perma.cc/7BAA-9VAY].
99 See Joby Warrick
& Karen DeYoung, Obama Reverses Bush Policies on
Detention
and
Interrogation,
WASH.
POST
(Jan.
23,
2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/01/22/AR2009012201527.html [https://perma.cc/34P3-7K35].
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Convention/Protocol.
As for the Arab/Muslim immigrant and refugee cases, the secret
evidence litigation strategies were marginally successful on the
international law arguments about the persecution bar. In fact, they
were not even attempted in the many habeas proceedings brought to
free the two dozen clients subjected to secret evidence in their cases.
In terms of Guantanamo, the complexity of the issues and lack of
proximity to Guantanamo Bay has meant that the public
understands very little of the fundamental rights at stake, making it
difficult for the legal strategies to tie into widespread civil society
activism. None of the interventions from the international
mechanisms—including the Inter-American Commission’s
decisions—made a dent in the policies towards the detainees.
Despite the really rather astonishing decisions by the Supreme
Court on the application and relevance of international humanitarian
and human rights law, overall there has been serious damage to
constitutional and international law protections by the Guantanamo
cases, particularly on the fundamental guarantee to be free from
torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.
As this snapshot of earlier efforts to defend against the excesses
of executive power shows, there are significant barriers to the use
of international legal strategies in refugee and immigration-related
cases. Primary among the barriers is the disregard by the federal
and administrative courts of Article VI of the Constitution.100
Despite the clarity of Article VI, section 2, and the early Supreme
Court decisions relying on it, jurisprudential doctrines such as selfexecuting treaties,101 political question,102 sovereign immunity, and
act of state doctrines routinely defeat the application of both treaty
and customary international law obligations in United States courts.
The political question doctrine has been a particularly aggressive
tool used by the federal courts and the government alike to refuse to
hear the merits of cases that the government finds politically or
ideologically unpalatable. In recent cases under the Alien Tort
100 US CONST. art. VI, § 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Law of any
state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”).
101 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829).
102 See Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. (Mujica I), 381 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1164
(C.D. Cal. 2005).
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Claims Act (ATCA) and the Torture Victims Protection Act
(TVPA)—claims which are grounded squarely on international
human rights law norms—courts have been willing to assert the
political question doctrine to pretermit claims on the merits relating
human rights abuses. This has been so, even in cases where the
government itself has not raised the objection, with courts reaching
out on their own to invite the State Department to submit letters of
interest to bar jurisdiction on political question grounds. Three
cases brought under the ATCA illustrate the point: Corrie v.
Caterpillar,103 Belhas v. Ya’alon,104 and Matar v. Dichter.105 Each
of these cases is a saga on its own, but the main point is that they
were brought on international law as well as domestic law theories
for victims of Israeli defendants or policies, and all were dismissed
on sovereign immunity or political question grounds on the courts’
own initiative.
Related to the setting aside of clear constitutional instruction of
the primacy of international treaty law, the fact that the United
States is party to few of the core international human rights treaties
in the first place remains a significant barrier. Aside from the few
human rights treaties the United States has signed, it has ratified
even fewer. Of the dozen most widely-ratified human rights and
humanitarian law treaties relevant to the issues in this discussion,
the United States has ratified six.106 Nor has the United States
103 Corrie v. Caterpillar, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (finding that a suit against a
company that sold bulldozers to the IDF to demolish homes in the Palestinian Territories
was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based on the political question doctrine).
104 Belhas v. Moshe Ya’Alon, 515 F.3d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal of
a suit against a retired general of the IDF for lack of jurisdiction under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act).
105 Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of a claim against
the former head of the Israeli Security Agency for IDF bombings in Gaza, finding the
defendant immune as a former officer under common law principles, and thus not reaching
the question of whether he is also immune under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
106 The most widely-ratified treaties on human rights and humanitarian law are the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC); the Convention on the Elimination of Violence against Women (CEDAW);
the Genocide Convention; the Convention against Torture (CAT); the Statute of the
International Criminal Court (Rome Statute); the Four Geneva Conventions (GC 1-IV);
and the two Protocols Additional to the Four Geneva Conventions (AP I and II). Of these,
the U.S. is party only to the ICCPR, the Genocide and CAT Conventions and the Four
Geneva Conventions. It is now the only country in the world that is not party to the CRC
and is one of very few non-state parties to the CEDAW and the Rome Statute (185 states
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ratified the core regional human rights treaty attached to the OAS
Charter, the American Convention on Human Rights, although its
argument on non-applicability of the American human rights
instruments is highly questionable and not accepted by the InterAmerican human rights bodies or most states in the region.107
Moreover, it has made limiting reservations to those few it has
ratified that undermine the core obligations under the treaty. For
example, the most common reservation the United States has made
to its ratification of human rights treaties is that they are not selfexecuting.108
The second most common reservation (or
‘declarations and understandings’ as the United States creatively
terms what the human rights bodies include as reservations) is that
the U.S. Constitution is supreme over any treaty obligation.109
These common reservations put the United States in a directly
opposing trajectory to the international consensus on the binding
nature of treaties, and the fundamental rules that domestic law
cannot be used to defeat treaty obligations and reservations are

parties and 108 states parties respectively). Although not widely-ratified, the International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families (CMW) is highly relevant to this discussion on protections of migrants in the
United States, to which the US is not a party.
107 The United States has consistently taken the position that it is not bound by either
the American Convention on Human Rights or the American Declaration on the Rights
and Duties of Man because it has not ratified the first and the second is not a binding treaty.
The Inter-American Commission has categorically rejected the second argument,
explaining that the main instruments incorporated directly into the OAS Charter under its
provisions are the Statute and Regulations of the IACHR and the American Declaration.
The IACHR statutes and the Charter provide that the IACHR is the organ of the OAS
having the jurisdiction to promote the human rights norms binding in the region, and those
norms are incorporated into the American Declaration for states that are not parties to the
American Convention on Human Rights. See Charter of the Organization of American
States arts. 3, 16, 51, 112 & 150. For a detailed explanation of the Commission’s position
on this, see Baby Boy v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
23/81, OEA Ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981).
108 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The United States and Human Rights Treaties: Race
Relations, the Cold War, and Constitutionalism, 9 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 321, 339 (2010)
(“[T]he United States has generally included ‘non-self-execution’ declarations within its
ratification of human rights treaties. These declarations are designed to prevent the treaties
from being enforceable in U.S. courts in the absence of implementing legislation.”).
109 For example, reservation 2 to the Genocide Convention states, “[N]othing in the
Convention requires or authorizes legislation or other action by the United States of
America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United
States.” See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art.
IX, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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invalid if they defeat the object and purpose of the treaty itself.
International law obligations on treaty interpretation appear in
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), a treaty the
United States Supreme Court routinely cites as customary law, but
to which the United States is not a party.110 The Supreme Court
doctrine that interprets a relevant treaty through the lens of domestic
law fundamentally subverts widely accepted treaty law interpretive
rules. Under the VCLT, a state cannot “invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.”111
Moreover, a state must refrain from defeating the object and
purpose of a treaty when the state has signed a treaty and pending
its entry into force “provided that such entry into force is not unduly
delayed.”112 A similar rule applies for reservations: reservations are
considered invalid if incompatible with the object and purpose of
the treaty.113 Unfortunately, U.S. position and practice put it
directly at odds with these rules.114
A direct consequence of the subversion of the rules of
international law and the Constitution that place treaty and

110 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
[hereinafter VCLT]. For a sample of decisions citing and discussing obligations to interpret
treaties consistently with the VCLT, see De Los Santos Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183
(2d Cir. 2008); Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 247 F.3d 423 (2d Cir. 2001); SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 390–91 (2006); Kreimerman v. Casa Veerkamp, S.A. de
C.V., 22 F.3d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 1994); Pliego v. Hayes, 843 F.3d 226, 232 (6th Cir. 2016);
Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., 179 F. 1279, 1296 (11th Cir. 1999).
111 VCLT, supra note 110, at art. 27.
112 Id. at art. 18. This provision is particularly applicable for treaties that the U.S. has
signed but ratification has been pending for years if not decades. See, e.g., International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, signed in 1977 but not ratified;
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, signed in 1980 but not
ratified; Convention on the Rights of the Child, signed 1995 but not ratified; Additional
Protocol I and II to the Geneva Convention, signed in 1977, but not ratified; American
Convention on Human Rights, signed in 1977 but not ratified.
113 VCLT, supra note 110, at art. 19.
114 U.S. courts apply the ‘last in time’ and ‘compatibility’ interpretive rules, but these
are inconsistent with the Constitution’s Supremacy clause and the VCLT rules cited above.
See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 (AM. LAW INST. 2015) (“An act of
Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international law or a provision of an international
agreement as law of the United States if the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule
or provision is clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly
reconciled.”). On the obligation to interpret domestic and international law provisions in a
manner that ensures compatibility, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOR FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 115, cmt. a, b (AM. LAW INST. 2015).
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customary international law equally enforceable as domestic law, is
the undermining of the principle that international law cannot be
interpreted on the basis of domestic law, but the other way around.
This methodology is what determined the outcome in Stevic,
Cardoza-Fonseca, and Sale, in which the United States Supreme
Court paradoxically interpreted the Refugee Protocol provisions to
defeat the U.S.’s fundamental obligations under the treaty: that is,
that all refugees are entitled to the guarantee of non-refoulement;
that all refugees must be guaranteed the right to access asylum; and
that no state can return a refugee coming under its jurisdiction to
refoulement. Justice Blackmun explained this backwards reasoning
in a scathing dissent in Sale, and expanded on the deeper domestic
versus international law problem in a later law journal article. His
explanation is worth quoting at length:
In construing Sec. 243(h) and Article 33.1 in Haitian Centers
Council, the Court once again failed to respect its first principles
of international law. Turning first to the statute, the Court
remarkably applied a presumption against extraterritoriality of
Sec. 243(h) without considering the fact that the statute was
enacted pursuant to a multilateral treaty, and without
acknowledging the primacy of the principle of non-refoulement in
customary international law. The Court thus ignored a maxim
recognized since Schooner Charming Betsy: an Act of Congress
and particularly a statute enacted pursuant to a treaty ought never
to be construed to violate a coextensive treaty or otherwise to
contract customary international law . . . .Having established that
Sec. 243(h) does not apply beyond US borders, the Court then
reasoned backwards to construe the language of Article 33.1—a
global convention—in light of its interpretation of American
immigration law. The language of Article 33.1 absolutely
prohibits the “return’ of any refugee ‘in any manner whatsoever,’
without geographical limitation. “The Supreme Court
nevertheless concluded that the prohibition applies only after a
refugee successfully enters US territory.115

This backwards logic permeates United States Supreme Court
and federal court decisions in the cases discussed here. This
115 Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J.
39, 44 (1994).
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incongruent methodology contributed to the inability of advocates
in all these cases to rely on bedrock international norms that could
challenge United States government actions that violated refugeerelated guarantees of non-refoulement, access to asylum, and
international interpretations of the refugee definition in the Central
American cases of the 1980s. It also undermined the ability of
advocates to bring international law to bear to the litigation in the
secret evidence cases of the 1990s. It prevented advocates from
successfully challenging U.S. obligations not to engage in torture,
cruel and inhuman treatment in the Guantanamo and other post-9/11
terrorism-related cases. Were the federal courts to respect the
primacy of international legal interpretations, international due
process guarantees including prohibiting the use of secret evidence
might have halted the erosion of rights that continue to be eroded in
the present.116
Finally, the lack of U.S. adherence to its obligations as a
member state in the Organization of American States towards the
Inter-American human rights system has been a major barrier to
more consistency between U.S. actions and implementation of
international legal norms. In the Central American crisis of the
1980s, the Arab/Muslim targeting of the 1990s, and the
Guantanamo detainee situation, the IACHR was proactive and
responsive to the multiple legal violations raised by civil society—
lawyers and activists alike. Its efforts fell on deaf ears due to the
entrenched position of the United States that it is not bound to the
American human rights instruments or to the jurisdiction of the
human rights bodies.
VI.

The Relevance of Re-Visiting International Law in the
Current Crises
The current moment is in many ways a reprise of what was
experienced in the immigrant and refugee communities and by their
advocates in the 1980s and 1990s. Right now, the renewed assault
on immigrants and refugees is occurring through policies similar to
those challenged in earlier decades. The Muslim ban and refugee
restrictions in the United States, however, are having massive

116 For a persuasive review of US treaty obligations that could support challenges to
the government abuses in the secret evidence cases, see Jaya Ramji-Nogales, A Global
Approach to Secret Evidence: How Human Rights Law Can Reform our Immigration
System, 39 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. (2008).
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negative consequences for millions more people around the world
than ever before.
Today, the world is grappling with the greatest refugee crisis
ever faced, yet the United States has completely abdicated its role
and legal responsibilities.117 The United States has pulled out of the
Global Compacts on Refugees and Migrants,118 and the Trump
Administration has reduced the 110,000 refugee quota of the Obama
Administration to 30,000—the lowest on record.119 Moreover, less
than half of those will succeed in overcoming the ‘extreme vetting’
that has been put in place. So far, only 12 Syrian refugees have been
resettled in the United States during 2018-19, of the more than 5.6
million Syrians hosted in mostly a few Middle Eastern host states.120
The new ‘extreme vetting’ process is making it impossible for even
approved refugees in the pipeline to succeed in traveling to the
United States.
Parallel to the limited effect international human rights and
international humanitarian law has had in challenging the worst of
U.S. policies towards refugees and immigrants, even in the more
robust international law environment in Europe, core international
law norms are rapidly eroding. For example, the research on the
Syrian crisis in the frontline host states has found that their
originally incredibly generous open-door policies have become
closed-door policies towards the refugees in the last few years.121
117 See Figures at a Glance, U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
https://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html [https://perma.cc/7JVH-JRVT] (“We are
now facing the highest levels of displacement on record.”).
118 See Patrick Wintour, Donald Trump Pulls US out of UN Global Compact on
Migration,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
3,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/03/donald-trump-pulls-us-out-of-unglobal-compact-on-migration [https://perma.cc/KE8T-6MCX].
119 See Lesley Wroughton, U.S. to Sharply Limit Refugee Flows to 30,000 in 2019,
REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-pompeoidUSKCN1LX2HS [https://perma.cc/992N-T9EG]; Joel Rose, Trump Administration to
Drop Refugee Cap to 45,000, Lowest in Years, NPR (Sept. 27, 2017),
https://www.npr.org/2017/09/27/554046980/trump-administration-to-drop-refugee-capto-45-000-lowest-in-years [https://perma.cc/3M2D-DSP2].
120 See Admissions & Arrivals, REFUGEE PROCESSING CTR. (Dec. 31, 2018),
www.wrapsnet.org/admissions-and-arrivals/ [https://perma.cc/A6SX-7JHU].
121
See, e.g., Krishnadev Calamur, The Nativists Won Europe, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16,
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/03/europe-refugees-syriaborders/585097/ [https://perma.cc/NX8H-2LHF] (“European Union data released
Thursday showed that the number of asylum seekers in the bloc declined for the fourth
straight year.”).
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This phenomenon has echoed in the pushback policies of the
frontline European Union states. For example, Greece and
Bulgaria, which had no history of detaining refugees, have turned
to constructing detention centers of isolating immigrants and
refugees in closed area ‘hotspots’ to contain huge numbers of
immigrants and refugees, preventing them from free access to
asylum.122
But international human rights norms are even more relevant
and necessary today. Among the needed strategies are norms to
address statelessness among migrant and refugee populations across
the world, including within the United States. It is more important
than ever to focus on historical root causes, including United States
policies in Central America that have created the push factors
forcing thousands of individuals trying to enter to apply for asylum,
and the concomitant international obligations the United States has
towards ensuring the right to asylum for them. Equally critical is
incorporating international norms in addressing the human rights
crisis in migration, including the crisis of thousands of disappeared
migrants from the Northern Triangle, and formulating transnational
and international solutions in partnership with the families of the
disappeared. Reviewing the lessons of the past, it is true that there
has been little success in the efforts to build international human
rights norms in advocacy work for refugees and immigrants.
However, it is also obvious that the U.S. domestic constitutional
framework has been woefully insufficient to protect the rights of the
most vulnerable refugee and immigrant populations and that
integrating international law norms into the domestic legal defense
toolbox is more urgent than ever.

122 See
Bulgaria
2017/2018,
AMNESTY
INT’L,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/bulgaria/report-bulgaria/
[https://perma.cc/QG4Z-JME9]; see also Greece 2017/2018, AMNESTY INT’L,
https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/europe-and-central-asia/greece/report-greece/
[https://perma.cc/E62M-78MP].

